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Abstract—Cooperative jamming approach in secure communica-
tion typically assumes dedicated and/or altruistic jamming nodes,
investing their resources for the good of the whole system. In this
paper, we consider a cognitive radio network with non-altruistic
jamming nodes, from which a source node utilizes jamming
service, compensating them with a fraction of its bandwidth for
transmission of its data. The nodes only know the distribution
of the gains of channels to the eavesdropper. Particularly, the
primary node injects confidential data and secondary nodes inject
open data at rates in order to maximize global utility function,
while keeping data queues stable and meeting a constraint on the
secrecy outage probability. The constraint on the secrecy outage
probability is met with the help of jamming service obtained from
the secondary nodes. Our scheme achieves a utility, arbitrarily
close to the maximum achievable utility.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, cooperative jamming,
cognitive radio
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, information theoretic security has gained significant
attention, provisioning an ultimate goal of guaranteed security
against adversaries with unlimited computational resources. Par-
ticularly, deploying cooperative jammers that transmit Gaussian
noise [1] or jamming codewords [2] can help improving secure
communication rates between legitimate nodes by impairing the
reception of the eavesdropper.
The jamming signal power should be high enough to disturb
the received signal at the eavesdropper; however, allocating
too much power on the jamming signal can also degrade the
signal quality at the destination. Thus, recent studies about the
secrecy gains acquired with the cooperative jamming involves
the optimization of jamming powers with the objective of
maximizing the secrecy rate [3], [4]. However, they generally
assume dedicated jamming nodes to the benefit of the system
performance. This assumption is not valid, especially for the
nodes with limited power. To that end, [5] has investigated a
class of secrecy problem in cognitive radio networks with non-
altruistic nodes. They propose a distributed solution using a
game-theoretic framework where a source node, towards the
maximization of its secrecy rate, utilizes the jamming services
from non-altruistic nodes, and in return these nodes obtain
utilization of some fraction of bandwidth of the source node for
their own data. Differently, here, we analyze a more realistic
scenario where only distribution of the channel gains to the
eavesdropper is available. Due to the lack of the knowledge of
instantaneous channel gains, perfect secrecy cannot be ensured
with probability 1 for confidential information. Thus, to meet
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Fig. 1. Network Model
a constraint on the secrecy outage probability, secondary nodes
transmit jamming signal to disturb the signal received by the
eavesdropper, and in return gain access to the channel to
send their own data which is proportional to the power of
their jamming signals. Secondly, with the goal of maximizing
the aggregate utility, i.e., sum utilities of a source (primary)
node and separate non-altruistic jamming (secondary) nodes,
we model the problem as that of network utility maximization.
We provide a dynamic solution, in which a joint flow control,
power and bandwidth allocation scheme is obtained by using
the stochastic optimization framework [6]. We prove that our
scheme achieves a utility, arbitrarily close to the maximum
achievable utility.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We consider a cognitive radio network of one primary user
and n secondary users, all wishing to communicate with a
common destination as shown in Figure 1, and there is an eaves-
dropper whose goal is to interpret the information transmitted
by the primary user without trying to modify it. Since secondary
users do not own the spectrum band, the transmission has to be
approved by the primary node.
Traffic is assumed to be a mixture of confidential data stored
by the primary node and open data stored by the secondary
nodes. Let Ap(t) and Ai(t) represent input rates in bits per
channel use with which data is injected in the primary node
and the secondary node i in slot t, respectively. The rates
Ap(t) and Ai(t) have long-term averages lp and li, respectively.
Up(l ) represents the utility obtained by the primary node from
the transmission of confidential data, and Ui(l )is the utility
obtained by the secondary node i from the transmission of open
data, both at a rate of l bits per channel use. We assume that
Up(0) = 0, Ui(0) = 0, and Up(:) and Ui(:) are continuously
differentiable, monotonically increasing and concave functions.
Time is slotted where the time-slot is the resource to be
shared among the primary and secondary users, and each slot
has a length of N channel uses (physical layer symbols), where
N is sufficiently large to allow for invoking random coding
arguments. All channels undergo quasi-static flat Rayleigh fad-
ing, i.e., all channel gains have exponential distribution, in
which the channel gain remains constant within a time slot
and varies independently from slot to slot. For a time slot
t, hSD(t) denotes the gain of the channel between the source
and the destination nodes; hSE(t) is the gain of the source-
eavesdropper channel; hJiE(t) and hJiD(t) denote the gains of
the channels from the the secondary node i to the eavesdropper
and destination node respectively. We normalize the power gains
such that the (additive Gaussian) noise has unit variance.
We denote the instantaneous achievable rate for the main
channel by Rp(t), which is the mutual information between the
channel between the primary node and destination in time slot t.
Likewise, Re(t) corresponds to the mutual information between
the channel input at the primary node and the channel output
at the eavesdropper.
In our work, we consider cooperative jamming where the
secondary user creates interference at the eavesdropper by trans-
mitting a jamming signal [3]. We assume that each secondary
node independently transmits noise signal, which lies in the null
space of the secondary node-destination channel, thus creating
zero interference to the destination. Defining Ps and PJi (t) as the
transmission powers of the primary node and secondary node i
respectively in a cooperative jamming setting in time slot t, the
transmission rates, Rp(t) and Re(t), can be obtained as:
Rp(t) = log(1+PshSD(t))
Re(t) = log

1+
PshSE(t)
1+åi hJiE(t)PJi (t)

(1)
Let b (t) be the fraction of time slot granted to the secondary
user in slot t for cooperating with the primary user to enhance
its secrecy rate. Defining PTi (t) as the transmission power of
the secondary node i reserved for its own transmission, the
instantaneous achievable rate of the secondary node is:
RTi (t) = bi(t) log
 
1+PTi (t)hJiD(t)

B. Confidential Transmission Scheme and Secrecy
We assume the availability of perfect channel-state infor-
mation (CSI) of the channels to the destination, hSD(t) and
hJiD(t), at the transmitters. We assume that transmitters do not
have the knowledge of the instantaneous values of the gains of
eavesdropper channels, hSE(t) and hJiE(t), but their distributions
are available 1. One should realize that, since instantaneous CSI
is not available, one cannot choose the code rates based on
a particular fading channel state. Instead, a particular coding
rate is chosen for the confidential message and the same code
is used for the primary node at all times. Specifically, the
primary node uses Wyner coding to provide confidentiality,
which basically inserts a randomization message to the actual
message to increase the level of secrecy [7]. Let C(Rˆp; Rˆ
priv
p ;N)
be a Wyner code of size 2NRˆp codewords, generated to convey
a confidential message set Wp 2 1; : : :2NRˆprivp . Thus, every
1The distribution of channel gains can be inferred by the node from the
received signals over the reverse channels, exploiting channel reciprocity.
codeword has a length of NRˆp bits to convey NRˆ
priv
p bits of
confidential information.
Let the vector of symbols received by the eavesdropper be
Ye. To achieve perfect secrecy, the following constraint must be
satisfied by the primary node, for all t,
lim
N!¥
1
N
I(Wp;Ye) e: (2)
Next, we define the notion of secrecy outage employed in our
analysis. We say that the secrecy outage event occurs, when the
confidential message is intercepted by an eveasdropper node.
This is when the perfect secrecy constraint in (2) is violated,
such that Rˆp  Rˆprivp < Re(t). Specifically, when Rˆp  Rˆprivp , the
rate of the randomization message the source uses in the random
binning scheme for secrecy in time slot t, is lower than the
actual rate of the eavesdropper, Re(t), in time slot t, a secrecy
outage has occurred. The probability of secrecy outage in time
slot t is given by,
Pouts (t) = P(Rˆp  Rˆprivp < Re(t)): (3)
As a qualify of service (QoS) requirement, the expected prob-
ability of secrecy outage of the primary node can be required
to be below a given threshold g . Note that the primary node
may not have channel quality to satisfy this QoS requirement.
With the help of secondary users, the primary user may have
a higher secrecy rate and meet this constraint, which provides
the incentive to share the spectrum with the secondary user.
The secondary users, on the other hand, are willing to join
the cooperation because they need such a spectrum opportunity
to transmit their own data streams. This lays the incentive
foundation of cooperation.
The potential cooperation can be established in the following
procedure. The primary user first announces the jamming power
levels of the secondary users such that the secrecy outage
requirement is satisfied. Then, the maximum spectrum shared
with the secondary users is constrained with these jamming
power levels, i.e., the expected value of bi(t) is below a
prescribed level, which is assumed to be proportional to the
jamming power level of node i. Thus, the primary user first aims
to minimize total jamming power purchased from the secondary
nodes while satisfying secrecy outage requirement. Secondly,
based on the predetermined jamming power, we seek a solution
to the spectrum sharing problem, where we want to maximize
the sum utilities of the primary node and secondary nodes.
III. CROSS-LAYER ALGORITHM
In this section, our objective is to design a cross-layer
algorithm considering joint flow control, time and power op-
timization while satisfying a secrecy outage constraint of the
primary node. We investigate two problems for this objective.
In the first problem, we aim to minimize total jamming power
subject to the secrecy outage constraint of the primary node. In
the second problem, we aim to maximize the aggregate utility
of the primary and secondary nodes by the optimized jamming
powers obtained in the first problem.
In time-varying wireless channels, a channel outage occurs
when the received signal to interference=noise ratio drops
below a threshold necessary for decoding the transmitted signal.
Likewise, a secrecy outage event occurs, when the randomized
information rate drops below the information rate obtained
by the eavesdropper. In this case, the amount of randomized
bits is not sufficient to confuse the eavesdropper, and the
eavesdropper obtains sufficient amount of information to decode
the secret packet. In the following, we analyze the secrecy
outage probability, Pouts .
Lemma 1: Given the statistics of the channels to the eaves-
dropper and the chosen secret encoding rates Rˆp and Rˆ
priv
p , the
secrecy outage probability, is calculated as:
Pouts =
n
å
i=1
 
n
Õ
j=1; j 6=i
l j
l j li
!
e lSED
"
1  lSE
lSE + liD
#
(4)
where D = 2Rˆp Rˆ
priv
p   1, and li = 1PJi E[hJiE ] for the secondary
node i and lSE = 1PsE[hSE ] for the source node. The proof of
Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix A.
A. Jamming Power Allocation
Here, we focus on designing the transmission scheme such
that the secrecy outage Pouts can satisfy certain secure level g
while minimizing total jamming power of the secondary nodes.
Specifically, we analyze the following problem:
min
PJi
n
å
i=1
PJi (5)
subject to Pouts  g (6)
Note that the above problem is a static optimization problem,
since only the statistics of the channels to the eavesdropper are
known, and the secrecy outage probability calculated in Lemma
1 is a function of these statics. Here, we solve the problem using
dual decomposition method that is particularly appealing to our
problem structure, since the objective function is linear, and the
constraint is affine function.
Let PJ represent the vector of the jamming powers of the
secondary nodes. Let us first introduce dual variable m to relax
constraint in (6). Then we have the dual function as:
D(m) =min
PJ
L(PJ ;m) (7)
where
L(PJ ;m) =
n
å
i=1
PJi +m
 
Pouts   g

(8)
and accordingly, the dual problem is given by
max
m
D(m) (9)
Let PJ = [PJ1 ;P
J
2 ; : : : ;P
J
n ] be optimal values of jamming
power levels obtained based on the optimization in (5) and (6),
which are obtained by the primary node in a offline fashion
before the start of spectrum sharing session. Note that to obtain
PJ, we need to solve (7) and (9). Since the function in (7)
is highly non-linear with respect to PJi , obtaining optimal P
J
i
is rather involved. Therefore, we use one of the search meth-
ods like gradient or bisection methods. Furthermore, the dual
problem in (9) can be solved using the subgradient projection
method [8].
B. Cross-layer Algorithm
Our objective is to design a joint flow control, time and
power allocation algorithm that maximizes the aggregate net-
work utility given the optimal jamming power allocation of
the secondary nodes, PJ. We aim to find the solution of the
following problem:
max
PTi (t);bi(t)
E [Up(xp)]+
n
å
i=1
E [Ui(xi)] (10)
subject to xp  E
"
(1 
n
å
i=1
bi(t))Rˆprivp
#
(11)
xi  E

RTi (t)

(12)
E

PTi (t)
 ai (13)
E [bi(t)] qiPJi (14)
The objective function in (10) calculates the total expected
utility of the primary and secondary nodes over random sta-
tionary channel conditions, and the time and power allocation
decisions. Condition (13) requires that the average power used
for its own transmission by the secondary node should be
smaller than a given constant power budget a . Condition (14)
is the spectrum allocation constraint of the secondary nodes,
where we assume that the maximum allocated spectrum to the
secondary node is proportional to its jamming power, i.e, qiPi ,
used to help the confidential transmission of the primary node.
Next, we propose a dynamic control solution based on the
stochastic network optimization framework developed in [6].
The dynamics of the primary and secondary node i queues Qp(t)
and Qi(t) are given as follows:
Qp(t+1) =
"
Qp(t)  (1 
n
å
i=1
bi(t))Rˆprivp
#+
+Ap(t); (15)
Qi(t) =

Qi(t) RTi (t)
+
+Ai(t); (16)
where []+ =maxf0; g, and we can relate the constraints in (13)
and (14) with a virtual queue as:
Zi(t+1) =

Zi(t)+PTi (t) a
+
; (17)
Ki(t+1) =

Ki(t)+bi(t) qiPJi
+
; (18)
Strong stability of (17) and (18) ensure that the constraints
are also satisfied [6].
Control Algorithm: The algorithm executes the following steps
in each slot t:
Flow Control: For some V > 0, the primary node and
secondary node i injects Ap(t) and Ai(t) bits, respectively, where
(Ap(t);Ai(t)) = argmax
Ap;Ai
V
"
Up(Ap)+
n
å
i=1
Ui(Ai)
#
 Qp(t)Ap 
n
å
i=1
Qi(t)Ai
Time and Power Allocation: For some PJi > 0 and Ps >
0, the primary node shares bi(t) portion of the slot with the
secondary node i, and the secondary node allocates the power
PTi (t) for its own transmissions. We choose these parameters as
the solution of:
fbi(t);PTi (t)g= argmax
bi;PTi
Qp(t)(1 
n
å
i=1
bi(t))Rˆ
priv
p
+
n
å
i=1

Qi(t)RTi (t) Zi(t)PTi (t) Ki(t)bi(t)

;
Let us define Fi(t) = Qi(t) log(1 + PTi (t)hJiD(t))   Ki(t)  
PTi (t)Zi(t), then
bi(t) =
8><>:
1; if Fi(t)> Fl(t); 8l
and Fi(t)> Qp(t)Rˆ
priv
p
0; otherwise:
and
PTi (t) =
8<:1; if
h
Qi(t)hJiD(t) Zi(t)
hJiD(t) Zi(t)
i+
and bi(t) = 1
0; otherwise:
Theorem 1: If RT (t) < ¥ for all t, then dynamic control
algorithm satisfies:
liminf
T!¥
1
T
T 1
å
t=0
Up(xp)+
n
å
i=1
Ui(xi)>U  BV ;
liminf
T!¥
1
T
T 1
å
t=0
E [Qp(t)] B+V (U¯ U
)
e1
liminf
T!¥
1
T
T 1
å
t=0
n
å
i=1
E [Qi(t)] B+V (U¯ U
)
e2
where B;e1;e2 > 0 are constant, U is the optimal aggregate
utility, and and U¯ is the maximum possible aggregate utility.
Theorem 1 can be proven following the same approach in
Theorem 4.5 in [6], and the proof of Theorem 1 is given in
Appendix B.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulation results, we consider logarithmic utility
functions of the primary and secondary nodes, where the utility
obtained by the primary node is k > 1 times more than the
utility obtained by the secondary node at the same rate. More
specifically, we takeUp(x)= k log(1+x) andUi(x)= log(1+x).
The utility function U(x) = log(1+ x) captures resource al-
location according to the criterion of proportional fairness,
which is based on maximizing total throughput while allowing
users at least a minimal level of service. We assume that the
gains of the primary node to destination and the secondary
nodes to eavesdropper channels are chosen uniformly randomly
in the interval [5,15], and the gains of the primary node to
eavesdropper and the secondary node to destination channels
are chosen in the interval [1,5]. The simulation is repeated for
3 realizations of the channel gains, and the result presented is
the average of these realizations. In addition, the ratio of the
utility obtained by the primary node and the utility obtained by
the secondary node, k , is taken as 5. The power of the primary
node Ps = 1 and qi is taken as 0.5 for all i.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
γ
Lo
ng
−t
er
m
 U
til
ity
 
 
Utility of Primary Node
Utility of Secondary Nodes
Aggregate Utility
Fig. 2. Long-term utilities with respect to g
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
α
Lo
ng
−T
er
m
 U
til
ity
 
 
Utility of Primary Node
Utility of Secondary Nodes
Aggregate Utility
Fig. 3. Long-term utilities with respect to a
Fig. 2 illustrates the effect of the secrecy outage probability
constraint, g , where a is taken as 1. As seen from Fig. 2,
the utility obtained by the secondary nodes decreases with
increasing g except when g is between 0 and 0:1. This is because
for low g values, in order to satisfy a tight secrecy outage
constraint, the primary node purchases a larger cooperative
jamming power, i.e., the maximum fraction of time can be used
by the secondary nodes is high. Thus, when g is between 0
and 0:1, the spectrum allocation constraint in (14) is active.
After g = 0:1, the time allocation constraint becomes inactive,
since the constraint is realized with strict inequality. Meanwhile,
the utility obtained by the secondary nodes decreases, since
there is a smaller number of transmission opportunities left for
the secondary nodes with more confidential information being
transmitted by the primary node.
In Fig. 3, we analyze the effect of the average power
constraint, a , on the utilities of the primary and secondary
nodes when g = 0:15. As seen in Fig. 3, the utilities of the
secondary nodes and the aggregate utility, are increased with the
average power constraint, as expected. Starting around a = 1:5,
the power constraint becomes inactive. In other words, giving
a larger power budget to the secondary nodes does not help
improve the system performance beyond a certain level.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a dynamic solution for
enhancing secret communications in wireless channel with a
non-altruistic jammer where secondary users help a primary
user to enhance secrecy against an intelligent and passive
eavesdropper. Assuming that the transmitters only know their
channel to the legitimate receiver and has statistical CSI on
their channel to eavesdropper, we have formulated and solved
a network utility maximization problem. Simulation results are
presented to verify the performance. In our future work, we
will investigate distributed version of our dynamic control algo-
rithms, where the optimal jamming powers and time allocation
decision are given according to local information.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In order to derive the secrecy outage probability, we first
need to statistically characterize Re(t) in (1), since transmitters
do not have the knowledge of the instantaneous values of
the gains of eavesdropper channels, hSE(t) and hJiE(t), but
their distributions are available. Note that the channel gains
are exponentially distributed with parameters lSE = 1PsE[hSE ]
and li = 1PJi E[hJiE ]
. We define Z and (Xi)i=1;:::;n as independent
exponential random variables with distinct respective param-
eters lSE and li; i = 1; : : : ;n. We start with the distribution
of the sum of independent exponential random variables for
the summation in the denominator of the rational term in the
log function, i.e., interference terms created by the secondary
nodes, in (1). The sum of independent exponential distributions
is hypoexponentially distributed [9]. Defining Y = X1+ : : :+Xn,
the probability density function (PDF) of Y is :
fY (y) =
n
å
i=1
lie yli
 
n
Õ
j=1; j 6=i
l j
l j li
!
(19)
We know that Z is also exponential with pdf fZ(z) =
lSEe lSE z. Now, re-writing the definition in (3), we are ready
to extrect the secrecy outage probability,
Pouts = P

Rˆp  Rˆprivp < log

1+
Z
1+Y

= P

D<
Z
1+Y

= P(D(1+Y )< Z) (20)
where D = 2Rˆp Rˆ
priv
p   1. Since the random variables Z and Y
are independent, we can calculate the secrecy outage probability
as:
Pouts =
Z ¥
z=D
Z z=D 1
y=0
fZ(z) fY (y)dydz
=
n
å
i=1
Z ¥
z=D
Z z=D 1
y=0
lSEe lSE zlie yli
 
n
Õ
j=1; j 6=i
l j
l j li
!
dydz
=
n
å
i=1
 
n
Õ
j=1; j 6=i
l j
l j li
!Z ¥
z=D
lSEe lSE z
h
1  e (z=D 1)li
i
=
n
å
i=1
 
n
Õ
j=1; j 6=i
l j
l j li
!
e lSED
"
1  lSE
lSE + liD
#
(21)
Now, we obtain the result in Lemma 1. This has concluded
the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The optimality of the algorithm can be shown by applying
the Lyapunov optimization theorem [6]. We consider queue
backlog vectors as Q(t) = (Qp(t);Q1(t); : : : ;Qn(t)), K(t) =
(K1(t); : : : ;Kn(t)), and Z(t) = (Z1(t); : : : ;Zn(t)), where n is the
number of secondary nodes in the network. Let L(Q;K;Z) be a
quadratic Lyapunov function of real and virtual queue backlogs
defined as:
L(Q(t);K(t);Z(t))=
1
2
 
Qp(t)2+
n
å
i=1

(Qi(t))2+(Zi(t))2+(Ki(t))2
!
:
(22)
Also consider the one-step expected Lyapunov drift, D(t) for
the Lyapunov function as:
D(t) = E [L(Q(t+1);K(t+1);Z(t+1))
  L(Q(t);K(t);Z(t))jQ(t);K(t);Z(t)] : (23)
The following lemma provides an upper bound on D(t).
Lemma 2:
D(t) B E
"
Qp(t)
 
Ap(t)  (1 
n
å
i=1
bi(t))Rˆ
priv
p
!  Qp(t)
#
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Qi(t)

Ai(t) RTi (t)
  Qi(t)i
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Zi(t)

PTi (t) a
  Zi(t)i
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Ki(t)

bi(t) qiPJi
  Ki(t)i (24)
where B> 0 is a constant.
Proof Since the maximum transmission power is finite, in
any interference-limited system transmission rates are bounded.
Also assume that the arrival rates are bounded, i.e., Amaxp and
Amaxi are the maximum number of bits that may arrive in a slot
for the primary node and secondary node i, respectively. By
simple algebraic manipulation one can obtain a bound for the
difference (Qi(t+1))
2  (Qi(t))2 and also for other queues to
obtain the result in (24)
Applying the above lemma, we can complete our proof. In
particular, Lyapunov Optimization Theorem [6] suggests that a
good control strategy is the one that minimizes the following:
DU (t) = D(t) VE
"
Up(t)+
n
å
i=1
(Ui(t)) j(Q(t);K(t);Z(t))
#
:
(25)
By using (24) in the lemma, we obtain an upper bound for (25),
as follows:
DU (k) B E
"
Qp(t)
 
Ap(t)  (1 
n
å
i=1
bi(t))Rˆ
priv
p
!  Qp(t)
#
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Qi(t)

Ai(t) RTi (t)
  Qi(t)i
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Zi(t)

PTi (t) a
  Zi(t)i
 
n
å
i=1
E
h
Ki(t)

bi(t) qiPJi
  Ki(t)i
 VE
"
Up(Ap(t))+
n
å
i=1
Ui(Ai(t))
#
(26)
Our proposed dynamic network control algorithm is designed
such that it minimizes the right hand side of (26). If the arrival
rates, and the time allocation parameter, qi, are in the feasible
region, it has been shown in [6] that there must exist a stationary
time and power allocations and rate control policy that chooses
the allocations and their arrival rates independent of queue
backlogs and only with respect to the channel statistics. In
particular, the optimal stationary policy can be found as the
solution of a deterministic policy if the channel statistics are
known a priori.
Let U be the optimal value of the objective function of
the problem (10-14) obtained by the aforementioned stationary
policy. Also let lp and li be optimal traffic arrival rates of
the primary node and secondary node i, respectively, found as
the solution of the same problem. Note that the expectations
on the right hand side of (26) can be written separately due
to independence of backlogs with allocation and rate control
policy. In particular, the optimal input rate lp and li could
in principle be achieved by the simple backlog-independent
admission control algorithm of new arrival Ai(p) and Ai(t)
for the primary node and the secondary node i in block t
independently with probability zp = lp=lp and zi = li=li,
respectively.
Also, since lp and li are in the achievable rate region, i.e.,
arrival rates are strictly interior of the rate region, there must
exist a stationary scheduling and rate allocation policy that is
independent of queue backlogs and satisfies the followings:
E
"
å
fij(s;i)2Lg
msi(t)jQ
#
 lp+ e1 (27)
E
"
n
å
i=1
RTi (t)jQ
#
 l i + e2 (28)
E
h
PTi (t)jZ
i
+ e3  ai (29)
E [bi(t)jK]+ e4  qiPJi (30)
Clearly, any stationary policy should satisfy (26). Recall that our
proposed policy minimizes the right hand side (RHS) of (26),
and hence, any other stationary policy (including the optimal
policy) has a higher RHS value than the one attained by our
policy. In particular, the stationary policy that satisfies (27)-
(30), and implements aforementioned probabilistic admission
control can be used to obtain an upper bound for the RHS of
our proposed policy. Inserting (27)-(30) into (26), we obtain the
following upper bound for our policy:
RHS< B  e1E[Qp(t)]  e2
n
å
i=1
E[Qi(t)]
  e3
n
å
i=1
E[Zi(t)]  e4
n
å
i=1
E[Ki(t)] VU:
where (55) follows from Jensen’s inequality together with
concavity of Up(:) and Ui(:). This is exactly in the form of
Lyapunov Optimization Theorem given in [6], and hence, we
can obtain bounds on the performance of the proposed policy
and the sizes of queue backlogs as given in Theorem 1.
